Russian chemical and petrochemical production 2026

ZapSibneftekhim drone attack

On 10 August drones attacked ZapSibneftekhim, the West Siberian Petrochemical Plant, at Tobolsk.  ZapSibneftekhim is the largest petrochemical complex in the Russian Federation for the production of ethylene and propylene.  As a result of the fall of several UAVs, a fire broke out on the territory.  Drones attacked the central gas fractionation unit at Tobolsk which is connected to the Purovsky gas plant in West Siberia.   Tobolsk is located at a distance of about 2200 km from the border with Ukraine.

Nizhnekamskneftekhim continued drone attacks

Nizhnekamskneftekhim was struck by drones on 10 August, following earlier attacks in the summer on 12 June, 8 July and 31 July.  The attack on 10 August appears to have been the largest, leading to 13 fatalities and many injured.  These attacks were supplemented by the accident at the end of March this year caused by internal safety errors, which resulted in 12 fatalities.  At the end of July drones struck the synthetic rubber division again, whilst also damaging the polystyrene plant.  

As the largest producer of synthetic rubber in Russia, Nizhnekamskneftekhim is major supplier to the Russian military.  Synthetic rubber possesses many applications which are important to the military.  Thus it may be naive to think that these plants would be ignored by Ukraine, which is fighting for survival, and would be allowed to carry on producing without being targeted.    

Nizhnekamskneftekhim Jan-Jun 2026

Despite a troubled year to date in terms of a major internal accident combined with drone attacks Nizhnekamskneftekhim increased production in the first half of 2026.  The increase was largely attributed to the start up of the new EP-600 cracker and ethylene hexene polymer plant.  In the first half of 2026 the company sold 1.59 million tons of products which was 6.4% more than in 2025.  At the same time net profits fell sharply and were 14.7 times less than in January to June last year to 1.5 billion roubles.  The decline in profits was attributed to a combination of weaker margins and growing liquidity in the domestic economy.

Nizhnekamskneftekhim faces several negative factors at the same time: not only a drop in revenue and profit, but also a reduction in cash and a sharp increase in accounts payable. The current financial condition shows a high dependence on third-party financing.  

Russian petrochemical industry and Hormuz crisis

The effect of the crisis in the Straits of Hormuz for the Russian industry petrochemical industry has been twofold. On the one hand, domestic companies faced an increase in the cost of imported raw materials whilst on the other the crisis caused a unique chance to replace the lost volumes of products on world markets.  However, this latter aspect of the crisis did not bring any meaningful growth for the major petrochemical producers.

The petrochemical industry in Russia is caught between an increase in capacity and output in some large projects, as well as pressure on the industry due to weak demand, high rates, sanctions and a strong rouble.  Growth is concentrated in a limited number of areas, including new large-tonnage capacities, certain segments of fertilisers, niche and low-tonnage chemicals, import substitution of comonomers, catalysts and special polymers. At the same time, there is moderate dynamics in a number of segments, a weak refining market and pressure on margins.

The fact that there are obvious signs of stagnation in the chemical industry has been discussed for more than a month, but now the fears have been confirmed by the data of Rosstat.   The production of chemical products decreased by 1.5% compared to the same period last year. The industry ended the first quarter with an indicator of -1.8%.

Russian petrochemical production Jan-Jun 2026

Russian ethylene production amounted to 2.278 million tons in the first six months in 2026 against 2.280 million tons in January to June 2025, whilst propylene production increased from 1.245 million tons to 1.354 tons.  Benzene production dropped from 666,584 tons to 638,389 tons, whilst a drop was recorded in styrene production from 371,283 tons to 365,103 tons. 

In other area of aromatic production toluene rose from 162,183 tons to 204,294 tons, whilst orthoxylene dropped from 93,101 tons to 69,342 tons and paraxylene dropped from 121,654 tons to 106,461 tons.  Ethylene glycol production increased from 188,173 tons to 203,872 tons.  Acetic acid production dropped from 98,956 tons in the period January to June 2025 to 90,478 tons in 2026.  Methanol production dropped from 2.056 million tons in the first six months in 2025 to 2.029 million tons in 2026.

The outlook for aromatics in the second half of 2026 is facing  huge challenges from the stopped production at many refineries.  Of the three xylene plants Kirishi is down completely.  Omsk and Ufa are currently operating, but could see production affected by continued drone attacks.  The problem for many Russian refineries is that sanctions prevent the purchase of specialised equipment from the West and there are limited alternatives.  

Russian polymer production Jan-Jun 2026

Regarding the production of bulk plastics in Russia, polyethylene rose from 1.794 million tons in the first six months in 2025 to 2.040 million tons in the same period in 2026, boosted by the start-up of the Irkutsk Polymer Plant.  The production of propylene polymers in Russia increased from 1.051 million tons to 1.141 million tons in the first six months in 2026.  The production of synthetic rubbers in primary forms dropped from 747,142 tons to 687,072 tons due mostly to reduced production at Nizhnekamskneftekhim after the accident at the end of March followed by drone attacks.  PET production dropped slightly from 334,093 tons to 331,256 tons.  PET is the one main polymer where Russia is dependent on imports. 

The main problem of the Russian polymer market in the first half of 2026 was weak domestic demand. Demand for polymers sank in construction (due to a high interest rate), in the automotive industry (due to a slowdown in production and problems with components), and in the tire industry. In addition, the commissioning of new capacities (Irkutsk, Kazan) has increased supply, which has not yet found adequate demand within the country.

The most important event in the second half of 2026 will be the launch of SIBUR's Amur Gas Chemical Complex (AGCC). It is expected that in the third quarter, one of the polyethylene production lines will be officially launched at the complex, and in 2027, the rest of the production lines will be put into operation, after which the total capacity of the Amur GCC will be 2.7 million tpa of polyethylene and polypropylene. This event will radically change the structure of the Russian and global polymer market, adding a significant amount of new supply.  However the introduction of AGKH will not affect Russian processors in any way and will not lead to a decrease in prices. The reason is that more than 90% of the output will be exported.

Russia’s chemical weapons and the chemical industry

Ukraine's Defence Forces have already recorded around 13,000 cases of chemical agents used by the Russian forces on the front lines since the start of the full-scale war.  That number keeps growing.

Russia’s chemical weapons programme is deeply intertwined with its massive commercial chemical and petrochemical sectors. Rather than operating in isolation, the development and deployment of banned agents, such as Novichok nerve agents and toxic riot control gases, rely heavily on dual-use infrastructure and covert supply chains.

The State Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology (GosNIIOKhT) is the primary state research institute that historically designed both Soviet-era and modern chemical weapons. Operating officially as a commercial/research entity, it has been instrumental in circumventing international treaties by synthesizing complex agents (such as Novichok) that resemble ordinary industrial chemicals.

Recent intelligence indicates Russian forces are utilizing improvised setups and drones to produce toxic compounds. This lowers the technological barrier, relying on commercial dual-use reagents rather than specialized military production lines.

Investigations have identified numerous Russian commercial enterprises capable of supplying reagents that have dual-use applications in both industrial chemistry and the synthesis of regulated agents. A significant portion of these firms maintain documented ties to the military-industrial complex.  The reported deployment of choking agents, such as chloropicrin, involves the domestic chemical industry and the procurement of precursors that are also used in standard industrial processes.

Although Russia officially joined the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997 and declared the destruction of its stockpile, international monitors have raised concerns regarding the development of undisclosed agents.  In response to the reported use of banned chemicals, several countries have implemented sanctions against research institutes, military entities, and commercial intermediaries to restrict procurement pipelines for dual-use materials.   Such agents have been used as a method of warfare by Russian forces in Ukraine, in breach of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Can Russia come out of this war without any loss of land?

The invasion of Ukraine was supposed to give Putin control over Ukraine and ultimately more land, but the longer the war continues the only prospect that seems to be emerging is one of losing land and even a break-up of the Russian Federation.  This may seem far-fetched from the outside, but the Russian empire was expanded through strength and that strength is quickly evaporating. 

The longer Putin remains in power and engaged in war against Ukraine, Russia will continue to go backwards in every sphere of social, economic and technological life.  Prior to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918 Germany considered plans to separate Russia into four separate states in order to suppress it as a military threat.  Whether some of those ideas could resurface is not clear but the difference these days is that China would want a say and would probably the greatest beneficary.   

Should such a break-up occur, there are many questions over petrochemical assets, under what country they would trade under and who would actually control these assets? 

US intelligence last year identified two Russian regions which are being monitored by China, one in the Amur Oblast and the other Vladivostok.  These two regions were once part of China’s Qing Empire. In the 19th century, the Qing dynasty handed them over to the Russian Empire.  There are no existing chemical plants operating in these areas but there are two huge projects close to completion, including the Nakhodka Mineral Fertiliser Plant and the Amur Gas Chemical Complex.   

This is purely speculative at this stage but with Putin cornered, unable to win the war and facing political suicide through retreat, the prospects for Russia are simply bleak.  Future historians will quite possibly see Putin as the man who destroyed Russia.

Data Section

Russian Petrochemical Production